Home » Ammonia Co-Firing in Power: Japan and Korea, Target by Target
Ammonia Co-Firing in Power: Japan and Korea, Target by Target
10 min read · Dec 2, 2025 · By Alex
A public target and a signed order are two different things, and the coal blending plans in Japan and Korea sit on the target side. Japan aims at a 20 percent blending rate in coal plants and has demonstrated it on one unit in 2023. Ammonia co-firing in power is a public target rather than a firm demand, the volume such a target implies is as large as the whole international ammonia trade, and I would only book that demand when the obligation sits in a contract with a price formula, not in a policy announcement. I read the chain behind it in the green ammonia guide, and this page is the power branch of that guide. Every figure below is dated where it appears, so policy stays visibly separate from trade.
I order this page in five moves: where the target comes from, what volume it implies, what it does to emissions and to the carbon price, what actually counts as demand today, and the contract I would ask for before I carry a tonne of it.
In short
- The target: Japan demonstrated a 20 percent blending rate on one coal unit in 2023; higher shares are announced intentions.
- The volume: full coverage of a national coal fleet at a 20 percent blend would need 20 million tons (2023), equal to all ammonia traded internationally.
- The emissions: 693 gCO2/kWh at a 20 percent blend, five times the 138 gCO2/kWh assumed for 2030 (2023).
- The carbon price: a 20 percent blend needs at least 300 USD/tCO2 in 2030 to work (2023), while a levy planned from 2028 is estimated at 8 to 12 USD/tCO2.
- The signature: 90 percent of traded ammonia moves on one to three year take-or-pay contracts (2024), so a target is not a booked volume.
In this article
A target is not an order
Plain words first. Co-firing means burning ammonia alongside coal in a boiler designed for coal, and the blending rate is the share of energy ammonia supplies. A coal plant burns coal for electricity. An offtaker is the party bound to buy; take-or-pay makes it pay for the contracted volume anyway. A mandate is a legal obligation, a target an announced intention. A portfolio standard grades the hydrogen or ammonia a utility buys. A carbon price makes an expensive fuel competitive, and a retrofit changes an existing plant so it can burn something else.
The molecule itself is a fertiliser feedstock: 77 percent of demand went to fertilisers in 2021 and 23 percent to industrial uses (2024). Power is the door that has to be opened on purpose, not the one buyers walk through by default. So when a plant announces an intent to blend, I ask what the obligation is, who enforces it, and what happens if the boiler does not run.
What this means for you: treat ‘target’ as a forecast of political intent, not as a line in your volume book, until a contract attaches to it.
Where the idea comes from
The idea comes from state policy, not from buyer pull. In the E3G briefing of April 2023, the Japanese government is described as promoting ammonia as a fuel for zero-emission thermal power and subsidising technology development at utilities and plant makers. One government-supported pilot at a coal unit aimed at a 20 percent blending rate in 2023. The country then aims to demonstrate 50 percent and, in the end, 100 percent ammonia power, a feasibility that same document calls questionable. Japan depends on imported fuels for 84.8 percent of its energy needs, and the argument used to keep older units running is that ultra-supercritical plants emit 15 to 30 percent less CO2 per kWh than subcritical ones.
Ammonia sits inside the hydrogen, power-to-liquid and e-fuels chain, so a power target pulls on the same production line that other buyers are trying to reserve.
What this means for you: sort these lines into subsidy, demonstration and purchase obligation, because only the third one carries your volume.
The volume the target implies
A January 2024 paper by BloombergNEF and Climate Technology Coalition gives the scale. World ammonia consumption runs at 187 million tonnes a year against a production capacity of 243 million tonnes, and only 10 percent of ammonia is traded internationally as it is. The market is worth 76 billion USD. The announced pipeline reaches 180 million tonnes of low-carbon plants feasible by 2035, against those same 187 million tonnes consumed every year.
Japan and South Korea promote co-firing with coal, while one operator in Singapore builds a 600 MW hydrogen-ready plant and examines a 60 MW ammonia-fuelled one; Singapore’s national strategy allows hydrogen up to 50 percent of projected electricity demand in 2050 (2024).
Announced capacity is not supply, and a target that needs imports needs shipping, terminals and long contracts before it needs a boiler (2024).
What this means for you: size the import chain first, because the boiler is the cheapest part of the promise and the last part you can order.
What it does to emissions and to the carbon price
Blending is not the same as decarbonisation. In April 2023 figures, a coal plant running a 20 percent ammonia blend emits 693 gCO2/kWh, five times the 138 gCO2/kWh the net zero scenario of 2021 assumes for 2030. At a 50 percent blend it still emits more than a gas combined cycle.
That arithmetic is done by the carbon price. Making a 20 percent blend economically viable would need a carbon price of at least 300 USD/tCO2 in 2030, while one national carbon levy planned from 2028 is estimated at 8 to 12 USD/tCO2. Carbon capture aims at 90 percent or more of plant emissions, a separate project with its own cost.
A power buyer who signs on a 2030 target is underwriting a carbon price that does not exist yet (2023). I keep the tools that could create one in low-carbon fuel mandates, which grade fuel rather than promise that a plant will run.
What this means for you: model emissions and carbon price together, and treat any volume signed against 2030 as exposed to a levy nobody has priced.
What counts as demand in this region
The December 2025 Southeast Asia briefing shows what regional demand actually looks like. Hydrogen demand was 4 Mt in 2024, of which ammonia took 49 percent, refining 31 percent and methanol 20 percent. By country it was Indonesia 35 percent, Malaysia 22 percent, Viet Nam 15 percent and Singapore 12 percent (2025).
Announced regional projects equal 12 percent of current demand, while only 6 percent of announced capacity has reached final investment decision. The region holds nearly 11 Mtpa of potential below 6 USD/kg by 2030. No certification scheme is in place yet, with work under way in three countries, and five countries have a national strategy (2025). For procurement I use the Southeast Asia and Singapore market page as the map. A strategy paper tells me where to look; it does not tell me what I can book.
What this means for you: in this region, demand that counts is demand with a certification path and a final investment decision behind it, not a strategy paper.
What a power buyer can sign today
The Global Hydrogen Review 2026 puts the traded base in perspective. Global hydrogen demand passed 100 Mt in 2025, low-carbon production grew 20 percent in 2025 to almost 1 Mt, and it should pass 1 percent of global production for the first time in 2026. About 80 percent of high-availability production is aimed at chemicals, refining and low-carbon fuels. Against that demand, low-carbon volumes are still a rounding error.
Ammonia trade still runs short: 90 percent of traded ammonia moves on one to three year contracts with fixed quantity and take-or-pay structure (2024), so the volume a utility books at a target review is rarely the volume it has already contracted. I treat offtake agreements as the instrument that turns a target into revenue.
What this means for you: check the contract length before you check the announcement, because a one to three year trade does not fund a plant built to run for 20 to 50 years (2024).
How I would write the contract
I write the commercial ladder in the order the market takes it: small near-term pockets first, starting with mining explosives and gas power generation before fertilisers and shipping (2024).
Then the mismatch. A producer securing renewable power may face a 20 year price agreement, while buyers used to a gas-indexed price rarely commit beyond a few years, and a green price can be two to three times grey ammonia (2024). Only 45 of 185 tracked low-carbon ammonia projects hold offtake agreements, while 15 are under construction or financed (2024).
- The clause I ask for first: blending volume, tenor, price formula, take-or-pay, and a delivery point that exists.
- The claim I refuse to make: anything certified, before certification exists.
The mechanics of that negotiation sit in how to secure offtake agreements.
What this means for you: sign the clause set before you sign the announcement, and refuse any claim that certification cannot yet carry.
The four lines I check before I book it
Four lines, checked in order before I book anything. First, the 2025 review’s five key questions report less than 2 Mtpa of firm offtake agreements cumulatively, about 5 percent of potential 2030 output, with only 9 percent of announced projects worldwide having secured committed investment against 0.5 percent in emerging economies (2025). A firm agreement is the only line that behaves like demand.
Second, cost of capital can reach 15 percent in emerging economies, three times the level of advanced economies (2025). Third, only 5 percent of announced projects in emerging economies show moderate operation potential for 2030, and 80 percent of them are export oriented (2025). Fourth, the electrolyser stack is 15 to 20 percent of installed investment, so the fuel price you underwrite is set by power, works and connection (2025).
What this means for you: if the first line is empty, the other three are refinements of a plan rather than a demand you can carry.
Sources
- E3G, Challenging Japan’s promotion of ammonia co-firing for coal power generation, briefing paper https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Briefing-Challenging-Japans-promotion-of-ammonia-co-firing-for-coal-power-generation.pdf, April 2023.
- BloombergNEF and Climate Technology Coalition, Scaling Up Hydrogen: The Case for Low-Carbon Ammonia https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/CTC-whitepaper_Ammonia_Final.pdf, January 2024.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026, Executive summary https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2026/executive-summary, 2026.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025, Southeast Asia, 9 December 2025 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/745a259b-9cb7-4e1d-9ba1-a8b63d1eaae8/GHR2025_SEA_Webinar.pdf, 2025.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025, Five key questions about hydrogen https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2025/five-key-questions-about-hydrogen, 2025.
Frequently asked questions
What is ammonia co-firing?
Burning ammonia alongside coal in a boiler designed for coal. A 20 percent blending rate means the boiler takes one fifth of its energy from ammonia, and binding fuel code rules for this use are not what drives the decision today (2023). What drives it is a political target plus whatever subsidy stands behind it, so I read the funding and the obligation as two separate questions before I quote a volume.
How much ammonia would a 20 percent blending target need?
Large volumes. One estimate for full coverage of a national coal fleet at a 20 percent blend puts the requirement at 20 million tons, equal to the total amount of ammonia currently traded internationally (2023). That is why I keep a blending target and a purchase obligation apart: one describes a boiler, the other describes a shipping programme, a terminal, a delivery point and a contract.
Does ammonia co-firing cut emissions enough?
Limited. A coal plant at a 20 percent blend emits 693 gCO2/kWh, five times the level a net zero pathway assumes for 2030, and a 50 percent blend still emits more than a gas combined cycle plant (2023). I compare that with the carbon capture route, which aims at 90 percent or more of plant emissions, and I only credit a reduction I can measure across the fuel’s life.
What should a power buyer sign first?
I sign a volume with a tenor long enough to cover the fuel premium, a price formula the lender can model, take-or-pay quantity and a delivery point that exists on a map, then I check certification before I sell any claim (2024). An announcement review is where I find candidates; the contract is where I find volume.
Not sure your project would survive a credit conversation?
A short call is usually enough to see where your project stands.
When a target has turned into a counterparty, this is where offtake agreements work: I take the volume, the price formula and the certification path and turn them into one negotiable document, so the demand sits in a contract instead of in a policy speech.
I do not provide investment advice or arrange investments. I act as a strategic advisor and facilitator.
Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia
I help low-carbon fuel and carbon removal project developers in Southeast Asia secure the commercial and financial partners needed to reach FID.
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