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Biogas

Biogas Policy in Indonesia and Thailand: What Each Framework Actually Pays For

9 min read  ·  Dec 2, 2025  ·  By Alex

indonesia thailand biogas policy

Comparing the Southeast Asian biomethane market, I find that the two governments do not pay for the same thing. Indonesia ties biogas to a waste decree that mandates waste-to-energy facilities, plants that turn waste into power and heat, in 12 major cities, while Thailand runs a feed-in tariff, a guaranteed price and a guaranteed purchase for electricity fed into the grid, whose 2022 guidelines extend to 2030 through an SPP Hybrid Firm programme of 200 MW and a VSPP Semi-Firm programme of 269 MW open to biomass and biogas. SPP means a small power producer, VSPP a very small power producer, firm capacity is committed on demand, semi-firm capacity is available most hours but not at peak. One framework is a treatment obligation with an offtake, a contract under which a buyer takes the output; the other is a priced contract with a queue.

Below I take the two logics in turn: the Indonesian decree, the Thai tariff, what each framework actually pays for, the feedstock question behind both, and the checks I run myself. I keep targets, ceilings and signed contracts apart throughout.

In short

  • Indonesia: A 2018 decree mandates waste-to-energy in 12 cities, so it fixes where a plant exists, not what it earns.
  • Thailand: A feed-in tariff runs to 2030 behind targets of 200 MW and 269 MW, and that ceiling gets allocated.
  • Indonesia’s money: An export levy funds biodiesel blending, not biogas electricity.
  • Thailand’s money: Biofuel volumes sit in the same plan that prices power, but the budgets do not mix.
  • Feedstock: Your input has other buyers, and your asset needs a maintenance owner.
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In this article

Two countries, two logics

The two frameworks differ at the level of the instrument, not of ambition. Indonesia creates an obligation: waste must be treated, and a waste-to-energy plant is how a city complies with a decree. Nothing in that obligation states the price of the electricity or the gas that leaves the plant. Thailand creates a purchase obligation on the buyer: a feed-in tariff fixes a price and a term for power fed into the grid, so the revenue framework exists before the concrete is poured, and the applicant joins a queue.

The error I see most often is a developer reading a national target as a tariff. A target describes how much a country wants; it names no buyer and no price. A decree states where a plant must stand; it does not state what that plant is paid. The price is agreed separately, plant by plant, and that negotiation is where schedules slip.

What this means for you: size the plant against a signed offtake or a published tariff, never against a national ambition, because ambition never appears in a revenue line.

Indonesia: a decree first, a tariff second

Indonesia starts with a decree. Presidential Decree No. 35 of 2018 concerns the acceleration of waste-to-energy plant construction and mandates such facilities in 12 major cities, so the siting decision arrives before any model is built: the plant belongs where the waste is, in a named city.

The same table of Southeast Asian policies sits in the IEA’s 2025 outlook for biogas and biomethane, and there it lists, beside that decree, Thailand’s Feed-in Tariff Scheme of 2022, applying feed-in tariffs to biogas, wind and solar projects until 2030, plus an Alternative Energy Development Plan proposal for 2024 to 2037. Malaysia’s feed-in tariff belongs to that same regional picture and needs its own read.

A decree fixes where a plant must exist, not what it will be paid. The price still has to come from a separate instrument, so it is negotiated with the buyer rather than published in advance.

What this means for you: treat the Indonesian location as an advantage and the Indonesian price as an open question, and carry that open question into your schedule before you commit.

Thailand: a tariff with a ceiling and a queue

Thailand prices the contract. In 2022 the Energy Regulatory Commission of Thailand released the most recent guidelines governing the expansion of feed-in tariffs until 2030, as recorded in the IEA policy note on Thailand’s feed-in tariff. Those guidelines endorse two programmes, an SPP Hybrid Firm programme with a target of 200 MW and a VSPP Semi-Firm programme with a target of 269 MW, and the tariff scheme covers new power plants using various fuel sources, including biomass and biogas.

Read those two numbers as ceilings, not as capacity waiting for a taker. A programme target is the maximum the scheme intends to add; it is then allocated, and allocation decides whether you connect this year or in three years. The tariff level matters less than queue position, and I would rather hold a modest price inside a guaranteed queue than a generous price outside one. Design questions of this kind recur across biogas power plants across Southeast Asia.

What this means for you: ask for the remaining headroom under the 200 MW and 269 MW targets before you ask for the tariff.

What the Indonesian framework pays for

What Indonesia funds is a liquid fuel programme. A blending mandate, a legal minimum share of biodiesel in every litre sold, ran at 35 percent in 2024 and became nationwide in August 2023, after B30 in January 2020 and B20 in 2018. The USDA attache report on Indonesian biofuels published in October 2024 puts 2024 biodiesel production at 13 billion litres, 3 percent above 2023. The programme is financed by an export levy, a tax on shipments out of the country, on palm oil products, collected and managed by the CPO fund agency BPDPKS, which subsidises the price spread between biodiesel and fossil diesel.

Feedstock decides who wins. Palm oil mill effluent, the wastewater of a milling plant, was expected to reach almost 2 million metric tons of exports in 2024, and palm fatty acid distillate exports run at 3 to 3.5 million metric tons a year. The National Energy Policy targets 23 percent renewable energy use economy-wide by 2025 and 31 percent by 2050.

So the levy pays for a mandate, while a biogas project producing electricity or biomethane has to ask a different budget line for its money. I read low carbon fuel mandates as a pull on feedstock long before they are a push into digestion.

What this means for you: establish who else pays for your input, because a funded blending mandate can outbid you for the same material without ever competing for your power offtake.

What the Thai framework pays for

Thailand sets volumes as well as prices, but not from the same purse. The Alternative Energy Development Plan 2024 sets a biofuel consumption target of 2 760 million litres by 2037, made of 1 185 million litres of ethanol, 900 million litres of biodiesel and 675 million litres of SAF, according to the USDA attache report on Thai biofuels published in July 2024. Consumption reached 2 892 million litres in 2023, up 4 percent, and was forecast at 3 030 million litres in 2024, up 5 percent.

Two details temper that picture. Renewable drop-in diesel is no longer commercialised in Thailand because subsidies were removed and production costs stayed high, and the plan carries a hydrogen target of 4 kilotonnes of oil equivalent by 2037, which reads as a signal rather than as a market.

The same ministry that prices biogas electricity also sets these biofuel volumes. The two budgets are not interchangeable, and a biofuel target buys no cubic metre of biomethane. Beside that tariff route, Singapore’s biomethane sandbox shows how demand can be created without a fixed price.

What this means for you: read the Thai tariff and the Thai biofuel plan as two separate ledgers, and confirm which one your product can actually invoice.

The feedstock question behind both

Both frameworks depend on an input that somebody else wants. Global demand for biogases climbs an estimated 30 percent over 2024 to 2030, to reach almost 2 270 PJ, around 59 bcme, per year in 2030, and the IEA’s Renewables 2024 shows that level falling 64 percent short of the 3.7-fold growth the Net Zero by 2050 Scenario requires. Across the same period the transport sector leads demand growth for biogases.

Demand direction does not build a plant. In 2022 a user survey for the Indonesia Domestic Biogas Program found abandonment to be a key issue: 256 of 554 respondents reported discontinuing use or facing problems with their biodigesters, and 225 units were repaired in 2023. Those are household units, but the failure mode scales.

Subsidy programmes of this kind fail on maintenance rather than on construction. The capital can usually be found once; the later service visit often cannot. I keep my feedstock search inside the biogas, biomass and biofuels industry directory.

What this means for you: name a maintenance owner and a maintenance budget before you draw a production curve, and check who else is buying the same feedstock.

My comparison checklist

Before I compare two jurisdictions, I run five checks, in this order:

  • Instrument: whether the revenue is a tariff, an export levy or a treatment obligation, because each pays a different party for a different act.
  • Headroom: whether the programme ceiling is already allocated, since a target of 200 MW or 269 MW is a maximum and not an available quota.
  • Buyer: whether the counterparty is creditworthy and bound by contract, rather than named in a decree or in a plan.
  • Feedstock: whether the input has a competing buyer, such as a funded biodiesel programme paying for the same oil stream.
  • Maintenance: whether the upkeep budget sits with the operator or with a subsidy, which decides whether the asset still runs later.

I run them in this order because they tend to fail in this order, and the first failure usually ends the file.

What this means for you: if any one of the five comes back unknown, the comparison is not finished, however favourable the headline target reads.

How I would present the two jurisdictions to a credit committee

I would show four dated rows before anything else:

  • Indonesia, 2018: a waste decree covering 12 major cities, an obligation to treat waste with no published price attached.
  • Thailand, 2022: programme targets of 200 MW and 269 MW running to 2030 under a feed-in tariff, a price sitting inside a queue.
  • Fuel volumes, 2024: 13 billion litres of biodiesel in Indonesia against a Thai target of 2 760 million litres of biofuel by 2037.
  • Market direction, 2024: almost 2 270 PJ of biogases a year by 2030, 64 percent short of the fastest path modelled.

I add one line of commentary: Indonesia asks whether you can be made to build, Thailand asks whether you can be paid to build, and biogas demand grows briskly through 2030 while still falling short of the fastest pathway.

What this means for you: expect the first question to be about the buyer and the queue rather than about the technology, so bring the offtake documents and the remaining programme headroom.

Sources

Frequently asked questions

Not as a published national instrument. The framework I can evidence is a decree from 2018 mandating waste-to-energy facilities in 12 major cities, which creates an obligation to treat waste and leaves the price of the resulting power or gas to be agreed with the buyer. The published tariff structure in this comparison belongs to Thailand, whose 2022 guidelines run to 2030. No tariff level in rupiah appears in any source I use here, so a model built on one is a model built on an assumption.

The 2022 guidelines endorse an SPP Hybrid Firm programme with a target of 200 MW and a VSPP Semi-Firm programme with a target of 269 MW, and the scheme covers new plants using various fuel sources, including biomass and biogas. Both figures are programme targets, meaning a ceiling the scheme intends to reach, not capacity already awarded to anyone and not an open quota for a new applicant. The practical question is how much of each ceiling remains unallocated.

Easier splits in two. Indonesia gives you a mandated location through the 12-city decree and a feedstock economy funded by an export levy behind a 35 percent blending mandate in 2024, so siting is clearer and input competition is fiercer. Thailand gives you a priced power contract running to 2030 behind ceilings of 200 MW and 269 MW, plus a biofuel plan targeting 2 760 million litres by 2037, so revenue is easier to forecast and queue position becomes the gate.

No. Indonesia’s National Energy Policy targets 23 percent renewable energy use economy-wide by 2025 and 31 percent by 2050, and Thailand targets carbon neutrality in 2050 and net zero emissions by 2065. Neither statement names a buyer, a price or a duration. Revenue comes from a tariff, from a levy-funded programme, or from a signed offtake, and only the first two are published in advance. Treat every target as direction, then go looking for the instrument that actually pays.

Want this comparison run against your own project?

A short call is usually enough to see where your project stands.

If you want this comparison run against your own site, feedstock and buyer, I do it in one working session, starting with grant and incentive screening wherever no published tariff sits behind the project.

I do not provide investment advice or arrange investments. I act as a strategic advisor and facilitator.

Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia

Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia

I help low-carbon fuel and carbon removal project developers in Southeast Asia secure the commercial and financial partners needed to reach FID.

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