Home » Hydrogen Market Overview: Demand, Supply and What They Cost
Hydrogen Market Overview: Demand, Supply and What They Cost
10 min read · Sep 5, 2025 · By Alex
The market I work from is not announced capacity, it is the hydrogen somebody buys and takes delivery of. Global demand sits close to 100 million tonnes a year, and in 2025 industry and refining accounted for almost all of it. Less than 1 percent of that production was low-emissions hydrogen in 2025, hydrogen made with little or no greenhouse gas released. This hydrogen market overview starts from the contrast between that real demand and the pipeline, capacity declared but not built, which is far larger than anything under firm contract. In 2025 cumulative firm offtake agreements, signed commitments to buy a stated annual volume, stood below 2 Mtpa. What follows is the market as it is, not as it is announced. The parent branch is green hydrogen.
I keep four questions apart here: who actually buys hydrogen, what is being built to supply it, what volume is signed, and what the product costs to make. Each section closes with a direct read for a developer at concept stage.
In short
- Demand: Close to 100 million tonnes in 2024, up 2 percent on 2023, and above 100 Mt in 2025, almost all industry and refining.
- Low-emissions share: Below 1 percent of global production in 2025, passing 1 percent for the first time in 2026.
- Pipeline: 27 Mt announced for 2030, against just above 6 Mt committed or with strong potential.
- Contracts: Cumulative firm offtake below 2 Mtpa in 2025, equal to 5 percent of announced 2030 capacity.
- Cost: Two to three times blue hydrogen in 2020, on a gap that widened in 2025 and is expected to narrow by 2030.
In this article
What I count as the market
The hydrogen market is the hydrogen somebody buys and takes delivery of, not the capacity somebody announces. A target is not a delivery, a pipeline, meaning capacity declared but not built, is not production, and a signed letter is not a contract. I keep three layers strictly apart in every region I read: demand, meaning tonnes actually consumed; supply, meaning plant operating or plant that has taken a final investment decision, the point at which a developer commits the capital; and contracted volume, meaning tonnes a buyer has committed to take.
Two of the three questions that decide whether a project is real are whether a buyer has signed and whether the price covers the cost. Both were still the binding constraint in 2025, and both were already the binding constraint in 2023.
What this means for you: decide which of the three layers your revenue sits in before you build a model. If the answer is pipeline, you are modelling an announcement, not a market that pays.
Where the demand actually sits
The IEA executive summary of the Global Hydrogen Review 2025 records global hydrogen demand close to 100 million tonnes in 2024, up 2 percent on 2023. New applications accounted for less than 1 percent of that total in 2024, almost all of it in biofuels production. Supply stayed fossil: 290 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 90 million tonnes of coal equivalent in 2024. Low-emissions production rose 10 percent in 2024, was on track to reach 1 Mt in 2025, and stayed below 1 percent of global production in 2025. More than 200 low-emissions projects have taken a final investment decision since 2020.
The demand I can count therefore sits with the buyers already in the chain, from refining to e-fuels, not with applications that only get announced.
What this means for you: size the market from tonnes actually consumed in 2024 and 2025, not from new applications in press releases. If nobody in your segment is buying hydrogen today, you are selling into an announcement.
What changed in 2025 and 2026
The IEA executive summary of the Global Hydrogen Review 2026 records global demand above 100 Mt in 2025, low-emissions production up 20 percent in 2025 to almost 1 Mt, and a first crossing of 1 percent of global production in 2026. The announced pipeline for 2030 shrank to 27 Mt in 2026, with committed and strong-potential projects down from 10 Mt to just above 6 Mt, while 22 Mt risk losing any chance to run by 2030 if decisions are not taken by early 2027. Installed electrolysis capacity doubled in 2025 to exceed 4 GW, with China behind nearly three quarters of new installations. Urea prices doubled between January and May 2026 after a supply disruption in the Middle East.
That is the spread I work with when I read the production process behind each tonne.
What this means for you: treat 27 Mt as an announcement and just above 6 Mt as the working base for 2030, because the rest needs an investment decision before early 2027.
What governments turned into rules
The IRENA and RMI study of 2023 records that at least 60 countries have published or are drafting hydrogen strategies. It assessed eight voluntary and five mandatory certification schemes and found that none of the existing systems is suitable for cross-border trade. The gaps sit in greenhouse gas information, common standards, ecolabelling, and environmental, social and governance compliance.
A national strategy is a policy signal, not a rule a buyer can contract against. A certificate that stops at the production point cannot travel, and a buyer in one country cannot take a producer’s evidence at face value in another. That matters most for the carrier that moves hydrogen across a border, which is ammonia, and it is why I read the green ammonia route as much for its paperwork as for its chemistry.
What this means for you: before you price an export tonne, check which certification scheme the buyer accepts and whether it recognises yours. Where none exists, the tonne is not yet tradable, whatever the plant costs.
What is actually contracted
The Global Hydrogen Review 2025 page of five key questions records cumulative firm offtake agreements, signed commitments to buy a fixed annual volume, below 2 Mtpa in 2025, equal to 5 percent of what announced projects could produce by 2030. By 2030, low-emissions production from projects that are operational, under construction or at final investment decision grows fivefold to 4.2 Mtpa. By 2030, emerging markets and developing economies could hold more than 9 Mt a year if every announced project materialises, about 25 percent of announced global production. In 2025, 9 percent of announced projects worldwide had secured committed investment against 0.5 percent in emerging economies, where capital costs can reach 15 percent, three times the level of advanced economies.
Those are the numbers I check first in a map of Southeast Asian developers.
What this means for you: count only tonnes under firm contract, then check whether your project sits in the 9 percent with committed investment or the 0.5 percent without. In 2025 capital cost moved more projects than hydrogen price did.
What supply costs
IRENA in 2020 put green hydrogen at two to three times the cost of blue hydrogen, and found strategies able to cut costs by 40 percent in the short term and up to 80 percent in the long term, with the resulting price able to fall below 2 USD/kg within a decade. The same cost curves put electrolyser costs at 650 USD/kW and 1 000 USD/kW in 2020, falling to 307 USD/kW at 1 TW of installed capacity and 130 USD/kW at 5 TW in 2050, on electricity prices of 65 USD/MWh against 20 USD/MWh. I express this as levelised cost, the all-in cost of a kilogram across the life of the plant, never as an equipment quote. Electricity is the line that moves the answer, so it is the line I price first.
What this means for you: test your price against a levelised cost built from a stated electricity price and a stated electrolyser cost. A cost claim without both inputs is a quotation, not what your plant will spend.
What this means for a Southeast Asian project
Low-emissions hydrogen grows from less than 1 percent of production in 2025 to around 4 percent in 2030 on projects that are operational or at final investment decision. Investment momentum slowed in 2025, with new final investment decisions in production falling for the first time. Around 80 percent of the production with strong potential targets chemicals, refining and low-emissions fuels in 2026.
Refining and chemicals are where the demand already sits in 2026, so a project that does not serve them is looking for a buyer that does not exist yet. For a regional developer the choice of layer is the whole decision, and a plant with no buyer signed has no revenue line to model and no basis for a lender, so I start the money question from the financing sequence I run before any model.
What this means for you: anchor on contracted volume rather than on pipeline, and treat the low-emissions share for 2030 as a ceiling for what is built, not as a market to sell into.
How I read the market before I model it
Between the two annual reviews, 300 ktpa of additional production, that is 300 thousand tonnes a year, reached a final investment decision in 2026. Around 80 percent of the production with strong potential targets chemicals, refining and low-emissions fuels in 2026. The cost gap with unabated fossil production widened in 2025 and is expected to narrow by 2030. So the cost side of the argument improves while the contracting side does not, and that is the shape of the market I model.
I read in one order: demand, then supply that has taken a final investment decision, then contracted volume, then cost against a price a buyer pays. I never start from the pipeline. Only once those layers are separated do I build a model.
What this means for you: run those four passes in that order and stop at the first one that fails. If contracted volume is near zero, everything after it is decoration.
Sources
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025, Executive summary https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2025/executive-summary, 2025.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026, Executive summary https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2026/executive-summary, 2026.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025, Five key questions about hydrogen https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2025/five-key-questions-about-hydrogen, 2025.
- IRENA and RMI, Creating a global hydrogen market: Certification to enable trade https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Jan/IRENA_Creating_a_global_hydrogen_market_2023.pdf, 2023.
- IRENA, Green hydrogen cost reduction: Scaling up electrolysers to meet the 1.5 C climate goal https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Dec/IRENA_Green_hydrogen_cost_2020.pdf, 2020.
Frequently asked questions
How big is the hydrogen market today?
Close to 100 million tonnes in 2024, up 2 percent on 2023, and above 100 Mt in 2025, with industry and refining accounting for almost all of it in 2025. New applications were below 1 percent of the total in 2024, almost all of it in biofuels production. Almost all of that hydrogen came from fossil fuels in 2024, from 290 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 90 million tonnes of coal equivalent.
How much of it is low-emissions hydrogen?
Low-emissions production grew 10 percent in 2024 to reach about 1 Mt in 2025, and grew a further 20 percent in 2025, passing 1 percent of global production for the first time in 2026. Low-emissions hydrogen means hydrogen produced with little or no greenhouse gas released, so the volume a buyer can contract as low-emissions is still very small.
Is the announced pipeline real demand?
Mostly no. The announced pipeline for 2030 stands at 27 Mt in 2026 against just above 6 Mt of committed and strong-potential projects, and cumulative firm offtake agreements were below 2 Mtpa in 2025, equal to 5 percent of what announced projects could produce by 2030. A pipeline is declared capacity, and declared capacity buys nothing.
What should a new project count on?
Contracted volume and cost. Count only what is under firm contract, then test the price against a cost gap that widened in 2025 and is expected to narrow by 2030, with renewable hydrogen only expected to become cost competitive by 2030 in China. A project with no signed offtake has no revenue to model, whatever the pipeline says.
Not sure your project would survive a credit conversation?
A short call is usually enough to see where your project stands.
If you are at concept stage, I run the same four passes as an investor introductions conversation, and the first question is always what is contracted in your segment, not what is announced. That is the check that decides whether the market exists.
I do not provide investment advice or arrange investments. I act as a strategic advisor and facilitator.
Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia
I help low-carbon fuel and carbon removal project developers in Southeast Asia secure the commercial and financial partners needed to reach FID.
Related articles

Pitching a Climate Tech Company to Strategic Investors: What the Corporate Has to Believe Before It Writes a Cheque
How to pitch a climate tech company to strategic investors: the metric cluster, the readiness evidence and the ask that corporates fund.

Biomethane: What It Is, How It Is Made and Who Buys It
Biomethane is biogas cleaned to pipeline quality. I explain how it is made, how it differs from biogas and who buys it in Southeast Asia.

CO2 Sourcing for e-SAF Projects: What the Rules Allow and What the Contract Must Say
Biogenic CO2, direct air capture or industrial flue gas: which sources an e-SAF plant may use, what they cost and which contract terms make the fuel certifiable.

Operating Performance Guarantees for SAF Plants: What Lenders Ask For
Minimum guarantees, performance damages, retesting and who stands behind them: the operating guarantees a SAF plant needs to keep debt and offtake intact.

EPC and Construction Risk in SAF Plants: What a Lender Actually Tests
FEED scope, convertible EPC, performance guarantees and damages caps: the construction risk questions a SAF project must answer before financial close.

Matching Feedstock and Offtake Risk Back-to-Back in a SAF Project: How Lenders Read the Chain
Lenders do not buy a feedstock plan and an offtake plan separately. They buy the link between the two, and the link is where most SAF files break.