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Hydrogen

Hydrogen FID and Bankability: The Five Proofs Before the Decision

10 min read  ·  Dec 2, 2025  ·  By Alex

hydrogen fid and bankability

A hydrogen project reaches a final investment decision when the sponsor commits capital. Committed capital must sit behind contracted revenue. The 2025 record shows how rare that combination is. In fact, only 9 percent of announced projects worldwide have secured committed investment. That is capital secured rather than announced, against 0.5 percent in emerging economies. Firm purchase agreements cumulate to less than 2 Mtpa. That equals 5 percent of what announced projects could produce by 2030. I keep the parent guide at how to finance a hydrogen project. This sub-hub asks what hydrogen FID and bankability demand of a dossier before committee. It also asks in what order a lender meets the proofs.

Here I order the five proofs I ask for. A lender meets them in order: committed money, the public layer and the capital stack. In addition, they cover what the asset must earn and the market record. Each proof carries a number I can check.

In short

  • Committed money: only 9 percent of announced projects have secured committed investment in 2025. The figure is just 0.5 percent in emerging economies.
  • Public layer: development finance institution loans reached 6.6 billion USD between 2021 and 2025. Investment in production reached 8 billion USD in 2025 (December 2025).
  • Capital stack: in January 2024, 8 percent of announced low-carbon hydrogen projects targeting ammonia had reached financial close or construction.
  • Asset earnings: in January 2024 ammonia production costs ran from 100 to 1,000 USD per tonne. They averaged 305 USD per tonne since 2013.
  • Market record: in 2026 the announced pipeline fell to 27 Mt for 2030. Committed plus high potential projects fell from 10 Mt to just over 6 Mt.
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In this article

What FID and bankability actually mean

I start with vocabulary. The final investment decision, or FID, is the moment the sponsor commits the capital. FEED is the front end engineering design that produces the numbers behind it. Bankability is the state in which a lender can size debt against the project’s own cash flows. Committed investment is capital a project has actually secured rather than announced. A firm offtake binds a buyer to volumes, and take-or-pay makes the buyer pay anyway. Equity is the sponsor’s own capital. The first loss tranche, by contrast, absorbs the first hit. Senior debt therefore sits ahead of equity in the repayment queue. Tenor is how long the loan runs, and a development finance institution is a public or multilateral lender.

The record in 2025 sits narrow. Firm purchase agreements, however, cumulate to less than 2 Mtpa. That is 5 percent of the production potential announced for 2030. Eighty percent of projects in emerging economies target export markets.

What this means for you: write these definitions into the dossier, so every claim of bankability reads against one vocabulary.

Proof one: committed money

Proof one covers committed money, the first proof I test. The Global Hydrogen Review 2025 page of five key questions states what a lender checks first. Only 9 percent of announced projects worldwide have secured committed investment, against 0.5 percent in emerging economies. In addition, cost of capital reaches 15 percent in those economies, three times the level in advanced economies. Only 5 percent of their projects show a moderate chance of operating in 2030. Eighty percent of them target export markets.

Two figures from 2025 set the scale. The electrolyser stack is only 15 to 20 percent of the installed investment. Most money therefore sits in process balance, construction and grid connection. Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia could produce more than 9 Mtpa by 2030. Building all announced projects would supply about 25 percent of global production. I read the regional side in how project finance works in Southeast Asia.

What this means for you: a file that cannot show capital actually secured is still a plan.

Proof two: the public layer

Proof two is the public layer, which carries risk before commercial debt arrives. The IEA Southeast Asia briefing of 9 December 2025 records the regional figures. Development finance institution loans reached 6.6 billion USD between 2021 and 2025. Production investment reached 8 billion USD in 2025. Meanwhile, public funding progressed by 38 billion USD since the previous review. It names a high cost of capital as the first regional barrier.

Regional demand was 4 Mt in 2024. Ammonia took 49 percent, against refining at 31 percent and methanol at 20 percent. Five regional countries hold a national strategy. Meanwhile, certification work runs in three of them (December 2025). Governments should reduce the cost of capital, build pilots and anchor demand in large applications (December 2025). I set out what each development lender covers in my page on development finance institutions.

What this means for you: size this layer first, since it absorbs the risk commercial lenders will not take.

Proof three: the capital stack itself

Proof three is the capital stack itself. In January 2024, BloombergNEF and Climate Technology Coalition tracked low-carbon ammonia projects. Eight percent had reached financial close or construction. Meanwhile, 45 of 185 tracked projects held an offtake agreement. Fifteen were in construction or financed. In January 2024 a developer may sign a fixed price electricity contract of 20 years. Bankers ask for a fixed price offtake of 20 years to hold the debt ratios. Meanwhile, 90 percent of traded ammonia moves on contracts of one to three years.

Non-recourse debt is lending repayable only from the project’s own cash flows. A 500 MW project came online in China in 2025. Meanwhile, the NEOM project in Saudi Arabia aims at 2 GW operating by 2027. That is a 75 times increase in six years (2025). I walk the layers in the NEOM capital stack walkthrough.

What this means for you: fix the 20 year mismatch in writing, or the debt ratios will not hold.

Proof four: what the asset itself must earn

Proof four is what the asset earns away from the paperwork. In January 2024 analysts expected green hydrogen costs to fall 66 percent by 2030. That would put the cost at 1 to 4.1 USD per kilogram. Ammonia production costs ran from 100 to 1,000 USD per tonne. They averaged 305 USD per tonne since 2013. The ammonia market reached 76 billion USD. Plants, in fact, run for 20 to 50 years at an average utilisation of about 80 percent.

In 2025 China holds close to 60 percent of world electrolyser manufacturing capacity. Renewable hydrogen there is 40 to 45 percent cheaper than in Europe or the United States. In addition, the electrolyser stack is 15 to 20 percent of the installed investment. A price quote differs from an installed cost. Specifically, the stack share shows where the money goes. I compare those figures with the regional cost record.

For your file, build the earnings case from these ranges. The plant lives on them for 20 to 50 years.

What I will not call bankable

What I will not call bankable starts with the announced market. The Hydrogen Council with McKinsey & Company roadmap of November 2025 sets the exclusions. May 2025 announcements covered more than 300 Mtpa of low-carbon ammonia projects against a conventional market of 200 Mtpa. For example, 85 projects and 35 Mtpa sit at FEED. Forty-eight projects and 15 Mtpa sit at FID. A further 1.3 Mtpa already operates as retrofits. The roadmap names three barriers: competitiveness against the conventional offer, difficulty tracking emissions and no long-term offtake.

Three more exclusions. An announced pipeline is not supply, since it fell to 27 Mt for 2030 (2026). An expression of interest is not a contract. Announcements, meanwhile, covered 7 Mtpa of offtake between 2021 and 2025. Only 1.6 Mtpa of that is firm (December 2025). A cost of capital is not a project return. Analysts quote 15 percent for emerging economies. By contrast, that is three times the level of advanced economies (2025). A contract for difference tops up a price to an agreed level. Instead, book-and-claim lets a buyer claim a reduction from a site it does not connect to.

What this means for you: I exclude any dossier that offers announcements where the committee needs contracts.

What this means for a Southeast Asian developer

In December 2025 announced regional projects equal 12 percent of current regional demand. Meanwhile, only 6 percent of announced capacity has reached FID. Close to 11 Mtpa of potential sits below 6 USD/kg by 2030, mostly in Indonesia. No certification scheme is in place, with work under way in three countries. The same record names a high cost of capital as the first barrier (December 2025). Demand exists, at 4 Mt in 2024, so the gap is a contract question. I set the regional picture against the Southeast Asia investment page.

In December 2025 export projects announced to 2030 reached 16.5 Mtpa. A named buyer covers only 4.2 Mtpa of that. Indonesia and Malaysia are the only exporters. Malaysia takes 73 percent of regional exports. By contrast, the region holds 17 percent of world ammonia exports in 2023.

What this means for you: name the buyer before the file goes anywhere. In fact, only 6 percent of regional announced capacity has reached FID.

The five proofs I would take to committee

The last proof is the market record itself. The IEA Global Hydrogen Review 2026 summary shows a market that still moves but slower. Low-carbon production rose 20 percent in 2025 to almost 1 Mt. Analysts expect it to pass 1 percent of global production for the first time in 2026. The announced pipeline, meanwhile, has fallen to 27 Mt for 2030. Another 300 ktpa reached FID. Committed plus high potential projects are down from 10 Mt to just over 6 Mt. In fact, about 80 percent of high potential production targets chemicals, refining and low carbon fuels. Four barriers remain: high costs, uncertain demand, slow or complex regulation and insufficient infrastructure (2026).

Nothing in that record is a production volume yet, since the pipeline is an announcement. One line dates the deadline. 22 Mt risk losing any chance of operation by 2030 without an investment decision before early 2027. In fact, two thirds of them are in Europe, North America and Latin America (2026).

What this means for you: take the five proofs in this order to committee. As a result, the file fails on the first proof that is missing.

Sources

Frequently asked questions

It means the debt can be sized against contracted cash flow rather than an ambition. Only 9 percent of announced projects worldwide have secured committed investment against 0.5 percent in emerging economies (2025), and firm purchase agreements cumulate to less than 2 Mtpa, 5 percent of the production potential announced for 2030 (2025). A file that shows neither is asking for debt against a plan.

No tenor is published as a rule, so I use the record. In January 2024, 90 percent of traded ammonia moved on contracts of one to three years with fixed quantity and take-or-pay terms, while a developer may be tied to a fixed price electricity contract of 20 years and be asked for a fixed price offtake of 20 years to hold the debt ratios. The gap between those two durations is where files stall.

The risk stage that comes before commercial debt. In December 2025, 6.6 billion USD of development finance institution loans flowed between 2021 and 2025, alongside 8 billion USD invested in production in 2025 and 38 billion USD of public funding progressed. That money prices risk, it does not replace the sponsor’s equity.

Because the money waits for a decision that has not come. In 2026 the announced pipeline fell to 27 Mt for 2030, committed plus high potential projects fell from 10 Mt to just over 6 Mt, and 22 Mt risk losing any chance of operation by 2030 without an investment decision before early 2027.

Not sure your project would survive a credit conversation?

A short call is usually enough to see where your project stands.

If you want the file tested against these five proofs before it reaches committee, I take on feasibility and financial model work for hydrogen and ammonia projects at pre-FID stage. My first check covers committed money rather than the model, and I tell you which proof is missing.

I do not provide investment advice or arrange investments. I act as a strategic advisor and facilitator.

Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia

Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia

I help low-carbon fuel and carbon removal project developers in Southeast Asia secure the commercial and financial partners needed to reach FID.

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