Home » Green Ammonia FID Risks: What Actually Stops the Decision
Green Ammonia FID Risks: What Actually Stops the Decision
10 min read · Dec 2, 2025 · By Alex
I can rank the risks that stop an investment decision before they reach your investment committee: regulatory and permitting obstacles were reported by 44 percent of cancelled projects, economic challenges by 28 percent, technical difficulties by 13 percent and absence of potential customers by 9 percent (2025), so permission, economics and demand arrive before technology. That ordering is the backbone of the green ammonia guide. It is the ranking I apply first to any green ammonia FID taken in at pre-FID structuration stage, where the dossier still has to survive a committee that has seen too many announced projects become nothing at all. The technology debate is loud, and it is rarely what kills the file.
I will order the risk the way a committee reads a dossier: the ranking itself, the cost gap, the contract risk, and the one thing a developer fixes first. Every section closes with what I would do about it.
In short
- Ranking: permission leads reported cancellations at 44 percent, economics 28 percent, technical difficulty 13 percent and missing customers 9 percent (2025).
- Cost gap: green ammonia reaches parity in some markets from 2024-2025 and beats grey in more than half of 29 modelled markets from 2034 (January 2024).
- Contract: only 45 of 185 tracked low-carbon ammonia projects hold an offtake agreement (January 2024), while 7 Mtpa of offtake announced between 2021 and 2025 compares with 1.6 Mtpa that is firm (December 2025).
- Region: announced projects equal 12 percent of current regional demand and only 6 percent of announced capacity has reached FID (December 2025).
- Fix order: permits first, the contract second, demand proof third.
In this article
What actually stops a final investment decision
The ranking is printed in the IEA Global Hydrogen Review 2025 full report (2025): regulatory and permitting obstacles at 44 percent of reported cancellations, economic challenges at 28 percent, technical difficulties at 13 percent, absence of potential customers at 9 percent, and 31 percent of cancellations hitting projects abandoned at an early stage, often on over-optimistic cost reduction assumptions or premature expectations of a market shift (2025).
The vocabulary I use in the room: the final investment decision is the point where the board commits the capital; FEED, the front end engineering design, produces the numbers behind that commitment; permitting is the permission to build and operate; an offtake binds a buyer to volumes; take-or-pay makes the buyer pay anyway; a firm offtake is one the buyer cannot walk away from. Nearly 45 percent of announced low-carbon hydrogen is destined for export, more than 16 Mtpa equivalent by 2030, but only 5 percent of export oriented projects have reached the investment stage (2025).
What this means for you: I put the permitting file in front of the committee before the process design, because permission is what cancelled projects report most often, and a dossier that cannot be permitted is not a dossier (2025).
The cost gap that has not closed
The arithmetic still waits on a fall that has not landed. Green hydrogen costs are expected to fall 66 percent by 2030, to 1 to 4.1 USD per kilogram (January 2024), and on that basis green ammonia reaches parity with grey ammonia in some markets from 2024-2025 and becomes cheaper than grey in more than half of the 29 modelled markets from 2034 (January 2024). The spread today does the damage: ammonia production costs run from 100 to 1,000 USD per tonne by region with an average of 305 USD per tonne since 2013, and a green tonne can be priced at two to three times grey ammonia (January 2024). The market in question is worth 76 billion USD and production and use account for 2 percent of global CO2 emissions (January 2024). I keep the regional arithmetic in the green hydrogen cost page for Southeast Asia in 2026.
What this means for you: I never carry a single cost number to a committee; I carry the range, the parity date and the price the buyer is actually comparing against (January 2024).
The demand risk hidden inside the process
Three barriers are named for low-carbon ammonia in November 2025: competitiveness against the conventional offer, difficulty tracking emissions reductions effectively, and the absence of a long-term offtake. The switch raises the finished product cost by 1 to 3 percent while cutting product emissions by up to 30 percent, against organic premiums of 20 to 40 percent (November 2025). Carbon intensity, the kilograms of CO2 per tonne of product, is fixed by the route rather than by the intention: technologies exist to abate more than 80 percent of the footprint, new low-carbon plants reach capture rates above 95 percent, and 35 GW of electrolysis is expected worldwide by 2030 (November 2025). One cost exhibit uses 130 USD per tonne of CO2 as a 2030 carbon cost assumption (November 2025). That is why I send a developer to the green ammonia production process page before any pricing work, because the pathway chosen fixes the carbon intensity the buyer is asked to accept.
What this means for you: I fix the route and the measurement method first, because a buyer who cannot see the emissions number will not commit the volumes (November 2025).
The contract risk lenders actually price
The mismatch a lender prices is one of time. BloombergNEF and Climate Technology Coalition set it out in January 2024: 90 percent of traded ammonia runs on contracts of one to three years on take-or-pay terms indexed to the Tampa benchmark, a price that can be two to three times grey ammonia, while a developer may be tied to a fixed price electricity contract of 20 years and bankers then ask for a fixed price offtake of 20 years to hold the debt ratios (January 2024). The same count puts only 45 of 185 tracked low-carbon ammonia projects with an offtake agreement, 15 in construction or with financing secured, and 8 percent of announced low-carbon hydrogen projects targeting ammonia at financial close or construction (January 2024). Announcement is not contract: 7 Mtpa of offtake was announced between 2021 and 2025 against 1.6 Mtpa that is firm (December 2025). The regional read sits on the Southeast Asia offtake page.
What this means for you: I count firm volumes only, because a 20 year offtake request set against a one to three year buyer habit is exactly the gap your committee will test (January 2024).
What the region does to your risk
The Global Hydrogen Review 2025 Southeast Asia briefing of 9 December 2025 puts regional demand at 4 Mt in 2024, with ammonia at 49 percent against refining at 31 percent and methanol at 20 percent (December 2025). Announced regional projects equal 12 percent of current demand while only 6 percent of announced capacity has reached FID, and close to 11 Mtpa of potential sits below 6 USD/kg by 2030, mostly in Indonesia (December 2025). No certification scheme is in place, work is under way in three countries, and a high cost of capital is listed as the first regional barrier (December 2025). Trade is narrow: only Indonesia and Malaysia export, Malaysia taking 73 percent of regional exports and the region 17 percent of world ammonia exports in 2023 (December 2025). I run the same gates on another fuel in the power to liquid investing and FID page.
What this means for you: I treat certification and the cost of capital as regional items with dates attached, not as excuses, because the briefing already lists both as work under way (December 2025).
What I will not treat as a blocker
The Hydrogen Council with McKinsey & Company roadmap of November 2025 marks what is solvable: more than 300 Mtpa of low-carbon ammonia projects announced in May 2025 against a conventional market of 200 Mtpa, with 85 projects and 35 Mtpa at FEED, 48 projects and 15 Mtpa at FID, and 1.3 Mtpa already online as retrofits (November 2025). Aggregated demand mechanisms reduce counterparty risk, create bankable offtake volumes and move a producer from FEED to FID (November 2025). A contract for difference, an agreement that fixes a price and pays the gap, is one of the levers named there.
Three exclusions. A certification gap is not a permanent wall, since work is under way in three countries (December 2025), and the instruments are known: a guarantee of origin proves where the molecules came from, and book-and-claim lets a buyer claim them without physical delivery. A shrinking global pipeline is not your project’s failure, since the announced pipeline fell to 27 Mt for 2030 with 22 Mt at risk of losing any chance of operation by 2030 without an investment decision before early 2027 (2026). A safety objection is not new, because ammonia has been handled for decades although fatal accidents have happened and wider use will raise safety and security questions (January 2024).
What this means for you: I strike these three from the risk register and replace them with dated milestones, because each has a mechanism and a clock attached (2026).
What this means for a Southeast Asian developer
On the regional side, the potential is close to 11 Mtpa below 6 USD/kg by 2030, announced regional projects equal 12 percent of current demand, only 6 percent of announced capacity has reached FID, five regional countries hold a national strategy, and certification work runs in three of them (December 2025).
On the global picture, low-carbon production grew 20 percent in 2025 to almost 1 Mt and should pass 1 percent of global production for the first time in 2026, about 80 percent of high potential production targets chemicals, refining and low carbon fuels, and the barriers that remain are high costs, uncertain demand, slow or complex regulation and insufficient infrastructure (2026). I keep the capital side of that picture in the green hydrogen investment page for Southeast Asia.
What this means for you: I write a Southeast Asian dossier against those four named barriers, because a committee will recognise them and ask which one you have already removed (2026).
The five risks I would put in front of a lender
The IEA Global Hydrogen Review 2026 summary closes the ranking with the 2026 view. First, permission and regulation, because slow or complex regulation remains one of the four named barriers. Second, economics, because high costs remain named. Third, demand, because uncertain demand remains named. Fourth, infrastructure, because insufficient infrastructure remains named. Fifth, the deadline, because 22 Mt risk losing any chance of operation by 2030 without an investment decision before early 2027 (2026). The same summary shows an announced pipeline that has fallen to 27 Mt for 2030 while 300 ktpa more reached FID, with committed and high potential projects down from 10 Mt to just over 6 Mt (2026).
What this means for you: I present five lines in that order, each with its milestone date, and I let the committee see which one is already closed (2026).
Sources
- Hydrogen Council with McKinsey & Company, Fertilizing the future: A roadmap to scale low-emission ammonia fertilizers https://hydrogencouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Fertilizing-the-future-FINAL.pdf, November 2025.
- BloombergNEF and Climate Technology Coalition, Scaling Up Hydrogen: The Case for Low-Carbon Ammonia https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/CTC-whitepaper_Ammonia_Final.pdf, January 2024.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026, Executive summary https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2026/executive-summary, 2026.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025, Southeast Asia, 9 December 2025 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/745a259b-9cb7-4e1d-9ba1-a8b63d1eaae8/GHR2025_SEA_Webinar.pdf, 2025.
- IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2025 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a6c466dd-b6f0-44bd-a60a-6940eccfb1c3/GlobalHydrogenReview2025.pdf, 2025.
Frequently asked questions
Which risk stops a green ammonia FID most often?
Permission, then economics: regulatory and permitting obstacles were reported by 44 percent of cancelled projects, economic challenges by 28 percent, technical difficulties by 13 percent and absence of potential customers by 9 percent (2025), and 31 percent of cancellations hit projects abandoned at an early stage, often on over-optimistic cost reduction assumptions or premature expectations of a market shift (2025). The order of work follows that order: permission, economics, demand.
Is the cost gap the real blocker?
It is a real constraint but not the only one: ammonia production costs run from 100 to 1,000 USD per tonne with an average of 305 USD per tonne since 2013, green hydrogen costs are expected to fall 66 percent by 2030 to 1 to 4.1 USD per kilogram, and green ammonia is modelled to become cheaper than grey in more than half of 29 markets from 2034 (all January 2024). The market being argued over is worth 76 billion USD (January 2024).
Do buyers block the decision?
Often yes: 7 Mtpa of offtake was announced between 2021 and 2025 against 1.6 Mtpa that is firm (December 2025), 45 of 185 tracked low-carbon ammonia projects hold an offtake agreement, and 90 percent of traded ammonia runs on one to three year take-or-pay contracts (January 2024). A signed agreement is not a firm contract, and only a firm offtake survives a lender’s test.
What should a developer fix first?
Permits and the contract, in that order: 44 percent of reported cancellations were regulatory or permitting obstacles and 28 percent were economic challenges (2025), while certification work is under way in only three countries in the region (December 2025). Once the permission file and the contract structure are in place, the technology argument turns into a conversation about price rather than about viability.
Not sure your project would survive a credit conversation?
A short call is usually enough to see where your project stands.
If you want the contract work run alongside your committee pack, I deliver contracting and risk management as a fixed scope: the offtake structure, the take-or-pay wording and the risk register, in the order an investment committee reads them.
I do not provide investment advice or arrange investments. I act as a strategic advisor and facilitator.
Alex, Founder of WeConnect Asia
I help low-carbon fuel and carbon removal project developers in Southeast Asia secure the commercial and financial partners needed to reach FID.
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